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In this paper, we examine the role which decision analysis can play in a situation 
requiring a mass evacuation. In particular, we focus on the influence diagram as a 
tool for reasoning and supporting decision-makers under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty. This powerful modelling tool can help to bridge multiple specialist 
domains and provide a common framework for supporting decision-makers in 
different agencies.  
   An influence diagram is also referred to as a decision network and can be 
considered as an extension of a Bayesian network. Like a Bayesian network, it 
contains chance nodes which represent random variables and deterministic nodes 
which represent deterministic functions of input variables. However, in addition, 
an influence diagram contains decision nodes which represent decisions under 
local control and utility nodes which can represent a variety of costs and benefits. 
These might be measured in several dimensions including casualties and monetary 
units. Advantages of Bayesian networks and influence diagrams over more 
traditional risk and safety modelling approaches such as event trees and fault trees 
are discussed - in particular, the ease with which they represent dependencies 
between many factors and the different types of reasoning supported at the same 
time, e.g. predictive reasoning and diagnostic reasoning. 
   An illustrative, generic influence diagram is presented of a situation 
corresponding to a CBRNE attack. We then consider how this generic model can 
be applied to a more specific scenario such as an attack at a sporting event. A 
variety of potential uses of the model are identified and discussed, along with 
problems which are likely to be encountered in model development. We argue that 
this modelling approach provides a useful framework to support cost-effectiveness 
studies and high-level trade-offs between alternative possible security measures 
and other resources impacting on response and recovery operations. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The nature of both successful and attempted terrorist attacks since 2001 have changed the 
perception of terrorist risk and consequently re-defined the public’s attitude and security 
professionals’ approach to the problem of public security. One of the key challenges 
which decision-makers responsible for public safety face today is balancing the cost of 
security measures with acceptable levels of risk.   
Whether facing a long-term decision regarding the desired balance of investment across a 
wide range of capabilities or a short-term decision under time-pressure regarding the 
evacuation of an area, decision-makers are expected to manage a large number of 
influential factors and constraints, to take account of multiple stakeholders and views, 
and to make trade-offs and choices which are coherent and defensible. Decision support 
tools, while leaving the final choice to the decision-maker, can nonetheless help the 
decision-maker to gain understanding of a complex problem situation. By helping to 
identify the most critical and sensitive aspects of the situation and by providing a 
framework in which trade-offs can be assessed in a transparent, structured fashion, a 
decision support model can help the decision-maker to better understand the nature of the 
problem and to navigate their way through its complexity in order to arrive at a more 
thoughtful decision.  
 
The risk management of public events, such as sport events, is a complex enterprise 
requiring cooperation between many organisations. One of the challenges is to build a 
common picture of the situation from the various pieces that are spread over multiple 
specialist domains and are owned by multiple organisations. For example, medical 
services should be informed and kept updated on current threats in order to prepare 
necessary resources to help potential victims in a timely manner. Therefore in the risk 
management domain, including mass evacuation, a new comprehensive approach for 
modelling interactions between factors spread over organisational boundaries would be 
desirable. Hudson et al. (2001, p4) argue that “The need for an innovative approach was 
clearly discernable through analysis of government information regarding terrorist 
events.” In this paper we outline an approach intended to support the building of models 
which encompass multiple aspects of risk management and mass evacuation, including 
identification of relevant risks, measures to mitigate them, costs associated with 
preparedness and possible consequences of successful attacks. Our approach is based on 
a decision model called an influence diagram and it emphasises a comprehensive 
approach to identifying key considerations and related costs.  
 
The influence diagram (ID) is a probabilistic decision model. The use of probabilistic 
models in risk analysis has been steadily increasing, giving rise to the term probabilistic 
risk analysis (PRA) (Bedford and Cooke, 2001). While event trees and fault trees come 
under this heading, so too do more modern approaches such as Bayesian networks (Pearl, 
1988) and influence diagrams (Howard and Matheson, 1984). Originally conceived of as 
an alternative, more compact representation of a decision problem than a decision tree, 
IDs are now more commonly regarded as extensions of BNs. Within the field of PRA, 
increasing use is being made of BNs and IDs. For example Ale et al. (2009) develop an 
integrated model of the air safety domain using BNs. The authors discuss their reasons 
for preferring this approach to more traditional methods such as fault trees and event 
trees. Ayyub et al (2009) employ an ID in a different role as part of their risk analysis for 
hurricane-prone regions. It is effectively used as a qualitative conceptual model of the 
overall situation. They then develop a number of event tree models based upon it. The ID 
is used to build and communicate an understanding of how the various parts of the 
system are related to one another. 
 
To illustrate this approach, we consider a scenario in which a radiological dispersal 
device, commonly called a dirty bomb is used in a terrorist attack at a major sporting 
event. First, a more generic model is presented which could serve as the basis of an ID 
for a wider range of scenarios. Then we present the more specific and detailed model. 
Rosoff and von Winterfeldt (2007) considered the likelihood of a successful dirty bomb 
attack on Californian ports and the likely consequences of such an attack, both in terms of 
casualties and economic damage. It is the latter which can be expected to be particularly 
high for this method of attack. However, the authors also showed that the chance of 
successfully mounting such an attack is much lower than for a conventional explosion. 
 
BAYESIAN NETWORKS AND INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
 
To explain IDs, it is convenient to introduce Bayesian networks (BNs) first, as IDs can be 
viewed as an extension of BNs to decision-theoretic problems. A Bayesian network 
(Pearl, 1988) is a graphical representation of probabilistic dependencies between a set of 
variables. BNs combine graph theory and probability theory to model complex domains 
involving uncertainty. The graphical part of a BN encodes domain variables which are 
represented as nodes and relationships between them shown as directed arcs (links). The 
graphical part, often referred as the qualitative part, allows for efficient and intuitive 
encoding of dependencies between entities and concepts (represented as variables) in the 
domain. All variables in the network have probability distributions associated with them 
– these probability distributions address the problem of encoding uncertainty related to 
variables and dependencies between them. The number of probability distributions 
required to quantify the model is dependent on the complexity of the graph. In this way, 
Bayesian networks bridge graph theory and probability theory to create a modelling tool 
that neatly combines both.   
 
Figure 1 Example of a Bayesian network 
 
A small example BN is shown in Figure 1. This simplistic model captures the probability 
of a successful terrorist attack given factors such as Threat Level and Security Measures. 
Since usually it is not known for certain if a particular event is a terrorist target, we 
should estimate the probability that the event will be subject to attack (probability 
distribution over the node Intended Attack). The challenge is to estimate that probability. 
One possible approach is to use the Threat Level, which summarises available 
intelligence at a high level and would typically be the result of in-depth analysis to 
describe a measure of current risk. For simplicity, we have assumed that there are three 
possible values: low, medium, and high, and we defined a probability distribution over 
these three states. The link between Threat Level and Intended Attack indicates that the 
probability of attack is dependent on the threat level – and for every value of Threat Level 
one needs to define a corresponding probability of the attack taking place: for example, 
assuming that the threat level is high, the probability of attempted attack is assumed to be 
0.1 (10%). Similarly we have assumed, for the sake of the example, Security Measures 
are dependent on the known threat level and there are two options: traditional and use of 
a special new detector system (detectors). Finally, the node Successful Attack defines the 
probability of the attack being successful given that the attack was intended and the 
security measures in place. In the BN graph, the node Successful Attack has two parent 
nodes – this indicates that the probability distribution over this node directly depends on 
both of these nodes. We need to specify the probability of a successful attack for each 
combination of the states of the parent variables. Two of these combinations are 
straightforward – if the attack is not attempted, it implies that there can be no successful 
attack. If an attack is attempted, we have assumed that there is a 25% chance of it being 
successful given traditional security measures and a 5% chance of it being successful 
given enhanced security measures, including use of the new detector system. 
 
Once the BN model is created, it can be used to perform reasoning using probabilistic 
inference. BN inference allows the calculation of posterior probabilities assuming that 
some variables in the model can be observed (evidence nodes) – for example: what would 
be the probability of a successful terrorist attack if we know that the traditional security 
measures are being used and the threat level is high? Inference in a BN can be both 
diagnostic (given a set of observations, determine the most likely states of some other 
variables, as in the example above) and predictive (calculating the effect of manipulations 
of some variables on other variables).  
 
BNs have been applied to numerous domains resulting in a wide range of academic and 
industrial applications (Pourret et al., 2008). Hardware diagnosis is a flagship application 
of BNs, with real-world examples such as Hewlet-Packard printer diagnosis (Jensen, et 
al., 2001) and aircraft diagnosis (Przytula & Choi, 2007). BNs have also been applied to 
risk analysis in the context of terrorist attacks - (Neil, et al., 2007) and (Hudson, et al., 
2001), for example.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the influence diagram was originally devised by Howard and 
Matheson (1984) as an alternative representation to the decision tree. One of the main 
problems of working with decision trees is that they become very large, very quickly. 
Since in a decision tree, every decision alternative and every outcome of a chance event 
is explicitly represented by a branch, and the chronological sequence of events expands 
outwards from left to right with every possible path displayed, even relatively small 
problems involving only a handful of decision and chance events, quickly explode into ‘a 
bushy mess’. This is particularly relevant at the conceptual stage of modelling when 
being able to visualise the situation and communicate understanding is crucially 
important. 
 
The influence diagram does not explicitly display every possible path through the 
problem and so permits a more compact representation. However, the original intention 
was to convert the influence diagram of the problem, once this had been agreed at the 
conceptual modelling stage, to an equivalent decision tree in order to solve it. Shachter 
(1986) describes an alternative solution mechanism, operating directly on the influence 
diagram. 
 
Nowadays, IDs are more often described as extensions of BNs (Jensen, 2001), 
particularly since the same junction tree algorithms can be applied to their solution. State-
of-the-art algorithms (Huang & Darwiche, 1996) are capable of performing inference in 
models with hundreds of variables in a matter of seconds. While both BNs and IDs are 
represented by directed acyclic graphs, the main difference is that IDs permit additional 
types of nodes and arcs. As well as the chance nodes and deterministic nodes which we 
find in BNs, IDs also contain decision nodes and value or utility nodes.  
 
Figure 2 Example of an influence diagram 
 
The meaning of chance nodes (represented by circles or ovals) and the arcs between them 
is exactly the same as for BNs. An arc between two chance nodes denotes probabilistic 
dependence and its direction indicates that the child node has been conditioned on the 
parent node. Consequently, to quantify the model, we will require a probability 
distribution of the child variable for every possible combination of the parent variables. 
While such arcs can indicate causality, they do not have to. Where a causal relation is 
present, it is usual to draw the arc showing the direction of causal influence as this 
normally results in a more efficient representation of the problem.  
 
Decision nodes (represented by rectangles) represent a choice between alternative courses 
of action for the decision-maker. An arc from a chance node to a decision node is often 
called an informational arc. Such an arc means that the outcome of the chance node is 
known to the decision-maker before the decision is taken. The arc from a decision node 
to a chance node means that the decision taken will affect the chance node, i.e. the 
outcome of the chance node is somehow influenced by the decision.  
 
In an influence diagram, there is always one terminal deterministic node called a value 
node which represents the decision maker's final goal or objective function. Value nodes 
are usually represented by hexagons. There may be more deterministic nodes, some 
possibly representing intermediate values, such as various benefits and costs, but there is 
always one terminal value node. This final value node is therefore required to weight the 
inputs from any intermediate value nodes in such a way that the decision-maker’s 
preferences can be represented and objective trade-offs can then be made between 
competing choices. An influence diagram is therefore a BN with a terminal value node 
and at least one decision node. However, when displaying as opposed to solving an 
influence diagram with several intermediate value nodes, such as the one presented in this 
paper, we have chosen not to include the terminal value node and all of its associated arcs 
from the intermediate value nodes, in order to reduce the amount of clutter in the 
diagram. 
 
Just like decision trees, IDs calculate an optimal set of decisions subject to the assumed 
probabilities of various chance events, the elicited preferences of the decision-maker for 
the various possible consequences and any evidence received from observable chance 
nodes ahead of those decisions. While such decisions are optimal in the mathematical 
sense, there will nearly always be additional factors not represented within the decision 
model which nonetheless have some bearing on the situation and which need to be 
accounted for by the decision-maker. This is one reason why decision support models can 
only ever advise and try to complement the experience and skills of a human decision-
maker. It is instructive, however, to understand how such ‘optimal’ solutions are arrived 
at. 
 
In order to identify the best course of action, we need to calculate the average or expected 
utility for each possible course of action. If ak denotes the k
th
 alternative available to the 
decision-maker, e denotes the evidence available to the decision-maker at the time of the 
decision, oi denotes the i
th possible outcome or consequence, and U(oi| ak) denotes the 
utility which the decision-maker associates with outcome  oi given their choice of action 
ak, then the expected utility of action ak given the available evidence e is  
( | ) ( | , ) ( | )k i k i k
i
EU a e P o a e U o a=∑ . This is just a weighted average of the utilities 
which can be realised, with the weights corresponding to the estimated probabilities of 
the realisable outcomes given the alternative chosen and the available evidence. The 
alternative which produces the greatest expected utility can therefore be identified.  
 
In the re-formulated example from Figure 1, presented in Figure 2, the node Security 
Measures is defined as the decision node. It no longer has a probability distribution 
defined over its states as the decision-maker chooses a state. Expected utilities associated 
with implementing the two security measures are calculated from the costs defined in the 
Cost node. The results of the expected utility calculations are shown next to the decision 
node. It can be seen that the traditional measures are more beneficial for the low and 
medium risk cases (expected utility -0.125 and -0.6, expressed in millions of £) and the 
new detector system is beneficial for the high risk scenario with the expected utility -1.5 
versus -2.6 for the traditional security measures. 
 
SCENARIO 
 
In order to illustrate the application of IDs to the problem of mass evacuation, we present 
a simplistic scenario. The scenario concerns the evacuation plan for a large sporting event 
held at a stadium. The stadium is assumed to be located on a river bank, without any 
bridges in the vicinity allowing for evacuation to the other side of the river. The stadium 
is otherwise surrounded by three areas which are different in character: a large park, a 
residential area characterised by a high density of small, private houses, and a small open 
space adjacent to the car park dedicated for the venue. A schematic map for the scenario 
is presented in Figure 3. Each of the three possible evacuation areas poses certain 
challenges and risks from the perspective of the evacuation. The park is characterised by 
large stretches of forested and relatively wild areas that can be accessed by vehicles and 
by the general public. The park offers large empty spaces that can easily accommodate 
crowds evacuating from the stadium. However, at the same time it is an area which 
cannot be easily cordoned off and it offers relatively good places for hiding explosives. 
The residential area features a high density of small, private buildings. The population 
living there undergoes constant rotation and does not create a strong community. 
Additionally, the area is characterised by a relatively high crime ratio and number of 
properties that are inhabited – ideal conditions for a terrorist group to perform their 
activities without drawing undesired attention. The car park area is relatively small, 
known to have insufficient capacity for larger events in the past.  
 
 
Figure 3 Outline of the scenario 
 
For simplicity of the presentation, our scenario is limited to account for two types of 
terrorist threats: traditional explosives and the radiological dispersal device commonly 
called a dirty bomb. Since a bomb attack involving a traditional explosive can be viewed 
as a special case of the dirty bomb attack without the radiation aspect, we will further 
focus on the dirty bomb scenario, assuming that the model can account for the fact that 
there was no consequent radiation. Obviously, the model should account for cases where 
there was no resulting dispersion of the radioactive material due to improper construction 
of the device, even in the case of an attempted dirty bomb. The consequences of a dirty 
bomb can be categorised three-fold: (1) immediate fatalities due to explosion and/or high 
doses of radiation, (2) prolonged effects of exposure to radiation, and (3) economic 
impacts due to radiation hazards in the area, decontamination, etc. In our model we 
explicitly represent these three categories.    
 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
We propose the following approach to model development: first, a generic model would 
be developed to incorporate general factors that should be present for the typical case of a 
major sporting event. The generic model would consist only of a qualitative (graphical) 
part and the definition of the states of variables and probability distributions would be left 
for quantification in the specific model. Consequently, the generic model would be 
customised to become the specific model based on a particular location, threats identified 
and the range of security measures available, etc. The model based on assumptions made 
in the above scenario is presented in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4 Model for venue evacuation 
 
The model should be viewed as a decision support tool at the stage of formulating 
security and evacuation plans. However, other possible uses will be discussed in 
subsequent sections. It is easiest to explain the model when a chronology of (potential) 
events is considered. In the upper part of the model, there is a set of nodes related to a 
possible attack and its prevention. In the middle part, nodes such as Population Density, 
Size of Blast, Number of Caught in Blast, etc. are specific for particular zones under 
consideration and define probability distribution over effects of attacks in the context of 
each given zone. In our example there would be four areas under consideration: the 
stadium, and the three possible evacuation zones: the park, the residential area, and the 
car park. Therefore, in Figure 4 these nodes are repeated four times. The remaining nodes 
in the model concern the overall and long-term consequences of the attack which are not 
specific to the location of blasts, therefore no distinctions between zones is made for 
these nodes.   
 
In the model there are several decision nodes, that define alternatives regarding: Visible 
Security and Invisible Security, Evacuation Plans, Immediate Response, Decontamination 
Response, and Subsequent Response. This set of decision nodes itself emphasises the 
potential of the model as a tool for combining expertise and data from different 
organisations involved in the emergency management process to create a comprehensive 
picture of the risk mitigation and response processes.  
 
The complexity of trade-offs is highlighted by a relatively large number of different 
utility nodes that represent various financial concerns (Cost of Security, Cost of Response 
Capability, Cost of Treatment, Property Damage, Other Economic Damage), human life 
and health concerns (Loss of Life, Severe Injuries, Slight Injuries), and other public 
concerns (Immediate Disruption, Public Confidence). As mentioned earlier, utility nodes 
can represent different and conflicting criteria (such as monetary value, human 
causalities, perception of safety by general public, etc.). In principle, combining these 
criteria is very challenging and tools such as Multi Criteria Decision Analysis have been 
developed (Linkov et al., 2006). In the framework of IDs, different utility criteria can be 
combined using multi-attribute utility nodes to provide a tool for trade-offs. 
 
The definition of each variable’s states and the assignment of particular values to 
probability distributions would be done in the specific model. The most effective 
approach to model development would start with an initial version of the model to be 
developed by a knowledge engineer. Then this initial draft would be presented to the 
subject matter experts for comments and review. Mahoney and Laskey (1996) present a 
good discussion of the model development process 
 
One of the key challenges with the problem of risk assessment and evacuation modelling 
is related to the nature of the problem, which is highly uncertain (terrorist intent, weather 
conditions, etc.), no reliable data is available (e.g. terrorist attacks are rare with constantly 
evolving strategies, no actual incidents of executed dirty bomb attacks), many aspects of 
the problem are highly qualitative in nature (e.g. public perception of events), and every 
instance of the problem is unique. In this context, subjective assessments are a necessity. 
Therefore, quantitative tools that support subject matter experts with knowledge 
elicitation and that support deeper understanding of the problem can be valuable. At this 
point it should be emphasised that the probabilities required to quantify the model do not 
need to be precise, rather rough estimates provided by experts may be sufficient in most 
cases. Sensitivity analysis can be used to identify parameters in the network for which the 
results are particularly sensitive and subsequent refinements of the model can be focused 
on only those parameters.  
 
MODEL USES 
 
One of the particularly useful properties of IDs is that they define a domain model rather 
than a set of specific scenarios. An ID encodes a joint probability distribution and 
corresponding utilities over the exhaustive set of possible combinations of states of all 
variables, which in practice means that it encodes all possible scenarios that can be 
described by the model variables. It achieves this by decomposing the problem into local 
interactions between related variables (through the model’s graphical part) and reducing 
in this way the number of required numerical parameters. Therefore, it is not limited to a 
small number of considered scenarios, as is the case with some techniques for risk 
management.  
 
Firstly, without any quantification, the ID can serve as a conceptual model of a complex 
decision problem. This aids communication and understanding between problem 
stakeholders and provides a convenient, common mechanism for the decision analyst to 
elicit and synthesise subject matter expertise from several different domains, e.g. police, 
venue security, health services and radiology. The intuitive nature of the ID also helps 
both the decision analyst and the domain experts to check what assumptions are being 
made, particularly regarding dependencies and independencies between variables in the 
model.  
 
Once quantified, a process requiring the estimation of probability distributions (either 
based on available data or the subjective opinions of domain experts) and the elicitation 
of preferences and utilities from decision-makers, the ID becomes a powerful decision 
support tool. Its most obvious use is to identify the ‘optimal’ course of action for a 
decision-maker given whatever evidence is available, in the manner described above. As 
noted previously, this mathematically optimum solution arises from an imperfect model 
of the real world situation and it is the decision-maker’s responsibility to judge how close 
the model’s assumptions are to reality. In doing so, the decision-maker should understand 
the basis on which the ID arrives at its suggested solution. While this requires some 
initial investment of time and effort from the decision-maker, the authors would argue 
that this is very likely to be handsomely repaid. It is worth pointing out that decision-
makers in many fields, from medicine to maintenance, are increasingly receiving advice 
and support from decision aids such as these.  
 
Our illustrative example concerned capabilities in hazard prevention, protection, response 
and recovery. Which of the many possible investments in each of these areas are likely to 
provide the greatest benefit within a given available budget? Following the elicitation of 
costs and their likely benefits for each alternative in these domains, and taking into 
account the dependencies within the domain, the ID helps to address just these issues.   
We contend that decision-makers and the analysts who advise them have much to gain by 
adopting a decision analytic approach to this type of question.  
 
As well as identifying a preferred course of action, a quantified ID can also suggest how 
important any unobserved information variables are. Indeed, it can put an actual value on 
such information variables. Comparing these to the expected costs of obtaining such 
information allows the decision-maker to identify which information variables are worth 
pursuing and which are not. Those worth pursuing can then be prioritized. This process 
makes use of the concept of value of information. This is simply the difference between 
the expected utility calculated with the information variable in question known and the 
expected utility calculated without this information. 
 
The ID could also be used to aid evacuation planning decisions. In the scenario presented 
here, there were several possible evacuation zones. However, given the danger of a 
multiple attack scenario, evacuation planners need to be wary of moving the evacuees to 
a zone at high risk of a secondary attack. Any evacuation plan should consider the 
attractiveness of the chosen zone to terrorists mounting such an attack. The likely 
population density of the evacuation zone and knowledge of its whereabouts, together 
with its proximity to sites where bombs could be placed and security is lower are just 
some of the factors to be considered. Red-teaming exercises involving terrorism and 
security experts trying to think like terrorists in order to identify weak spots and assess 
terrorist preferences could also inform such modelling and planning.  
 
An additional use of such models, or at least the BN part of such models, is forensic 
diagnosis. For example, by observing the effects of a blast, inference can be made about 
the quantity and type of materials used. In some cases, inferences about the skills, 
capabilities and resources of the group responsible might also prove valuable, particularly 
when combined with information from police and intelligence agencies. Taroni et al. 
(2006) present a variety of applications of BNs in forensic science more generally.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Even though BNs and IDs are powerful tools for modelling risk and can provide many 
benefits, as discussed earlier, not all aspects can be sufficiently modelled and captured 
within this framework. In particular, aspects related to the physics of explosives, their 
lethality, radiological material dispersion and radioactivity, weather considerations, etc. 
can be modelled more accurately and efficiently with other modelling techniques. In our 
opinion these models should be viewed as complementary.  
 
In this paper we discussed application of IDs to the problem of risk management and 
mass evacuation. A generic ID model for CBRNE attack was developed. The generic 
model was customised for a simple scenario concerning a dirty bomb attack on a sporting 
event in order to discuss the benefits and challenges of developing ID models for risk 
management and evacuation planning. Several potential alternative uses of the model 
were also discussed.  
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